Thanks to @schneierblog for quoting advice for the mobile traveller who 'leaves his cellphone and laptop at home and instead brings "loaner" devices, which he erases before he leaves [home] and wipes clean the minute he returns. In [country], he disables Bluetooth and Wi-Fi, never lets his phone out of his sight and, in meetings, not only turns off his phone but also removes the battery, for fear his microphone could be turned on remotely. He connects to the Internet only through an encrypted, password-protected channel, and copies and pastes his password from a USB thumb drive. He never types in a password directly, because, he said, "[they] are very good at installing key-logging software on your laptop."'
All well and good, but the comments point out that we need equal concern about security from corporate espionage at 'home' as well as 'abroad.' And that all we can do is limit risks, not eliminate them: there is always a chink of opportunity that can be exploited.
